Jameson Raid 1895

The first talks of an attempted coup started in early 1894 between board members of the Werner, Beit, and Company discussing the economic issues inflicted by the Kruger administration, ultimately explaining the organization’s 175,000-pound donation to arming and outfitting the plotters.[i] Until September 1894, during Rhodes victory tour of Matabeleland, no information exists of Rhodes actual involvement in the plot, however; after September he took a starring roll in the preparations of the plot after meeting with American mining engineer Hammond. Following this meeting, Rhodes established a pretext to move BSAC police into the Bechuanaland Protectorate by claiming to build railway extension from Mafeking. At this point, the plan took the name “Jameson Plan.” [ii]

The preparation of the plot began to take place following the established jumping off point for the “Jameson Plan.” First, the BSAC dispatched Dr. F. Rutherford Harris to London in order to consult with the board of directors and establish liaison with the Colonial Press Office by securing Miss Flora Shaw to act as a go between. In a matter of mere weeks, the BSAC obtained permission to begin operations in the Bechuanaland in order to create a railway and acquired an on call press agent connected with the London Times, allowing the BSAC to control the press stories released in conjunction with the “Jameson Plan.”[iii] The finale actions by Harris focused on the acquisition of arms for the several different elements of the “Jameson Plan.”

With the success of Harris’s operations in London both Alfred Beit and Cecil Rhodes systematically sounded out the feelings of the Uitlanders during the whole of 1895 in regards to the Transvaal government. Without skipping a beat, both Rhodes and Beit were able to influence the production of the August 1895 petition, requesting franchise for Uitlanders, by consulting the leaders of the National Union and the Chamber of mines.[iv] In many ways, this petition allowed both Charles Leonard and Lionel Phillips a chance to sound out if a coup could succeed, allow them to excuse their move towards revolution as an only route, and solidify the miners grievances towards the Boer population. It ultimatly formed the basis of the "reform movement."

While the plot began to take form as a meticulously shaped plan, other portions of the plan began to slip into the cracks. First, in the late 1895s based on testimony from the Select Committee both the Johannesburg area and Jameson on the Bechuanaland suffered a major break down in communications. Jameson did not fully understand his roll in the upcoming coup, nor did the group in Johannesburg.[v] Second, the ingenious method devised for smuggling weaponry into Johannesburg under the watch of Captain Holden at De Beers, which consisted of weaponry hidden in oil drums and trucks of coke, failed to fulfill the conspirators’ requirements at the rapid rate required. Third, the reform movement passed to Jameson only their plans and not the full “program” of events to take place leaving Jameson in the dark to a precise timeline of operations.[vi] During Jameson’s last meeting with the group in October 1894, Jameson received the infamous letter of invitation, which remained undated. By early December, the “reform movement” sent various telegrams warning of a lack of substantial popular support for the operation, putting the coup in a precarious position.[vii]

On December 27, 1895, the “reform movement” released its National Union Manifesto in the Cape Times, which identified the grievances held by the Uitlanders against the Transvaal government. While the manifesto identified several grievances of Uitlanders, it contained the majority of the major gripes of mining interest in their taxation, rail charges, the dynamite concession, tariffs, and the Transvaal government’s monopoly concessions of essential items.[viii]

With some degree of certainty, this letter needed a response from the Transvaal government in order for Jameson to begin his movement, however; on the December 29, 1895, Jameson began his infamous advance following a night of drunkenness by his makeshift force, while the “reform movement” collapsed.[ix]

Jameson’s advance began in all earnest with soldiers spilling out of their saddles still drunk from the previous nights miss adventure. Things got worse when a drunken soldier cutting the telegraph wire to Pretoria accidently cut the wire to a wire fence instead, allowing the Transvaal government to learn of Jameson’s advance.[x] The beginnings of the advance resembled an episode of the Three Stooges, costing the raiders the element of surprise and speed, since the first hours of the advance consisted of picking drunken soldiers off the ground. For the first three days Jameson’s column meet no resistance except for arresting Paul Kruger’s grandson, Saul Johannes Eloff, after he challenged the nature of the column only to be released a few hours later on his own parole, only to start a near riot in Johannesburg almost a week later.[xi]

On January 1, 1896, Jameson’s column began to engage Boer forces near Krugersdrop. The Boer forces positioned themselves on the high ground and inflicted several casualties amongst Jameson’s men after a failed cavalry charge forcing Jameson to withdraw to the South. The next morning, Jameson found himself confronted by several hundred Boers and began trying futilely to breakthrough the Boers to Johannesburg, while expecting reinforcements from the “reform movement” that never arrived, due to the lack of intent of the movement.[xii] With casualties mounting and the condition of the raiders worsening, and due to lack of food, Jameson surrendered to the Boer forces.[xiii]

While Jameson surrendered, the “reform movement” faced a situation of bedlam in the streets of Johannesburg trying to figure out how to control the mob now taking to the streets in a panic. The “reform movement” found itself unable to organize a defense for the city of Johannesburg following the withdrawal of the Johannesburg police, which left fearing of a break out of hostilities in the town.[xiv]

By January 4, 1896, the town of Johannesburg agreed to lay down arms and allow the Transvaal government to return into the area, providing that their grievances be addressed with the British government act as a mediator.[xv] The “Jameson Plan” failed to accomplish any of its planned goals or objectives opening the BSAC to the full rage of both the Transvaal government and the British government. Business in Johannesburg returned to normal the moment after the announcement.

[i] F. Edmund Garrett, The Story of an African Crises (Westminster, UK: Archibald Constable and Co), 34 G.
Blainey, Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid, The Economic History Review, Vol. 18 No.2 (1965), 365

[ii] Hugh Marshall Hole, The Jameson Raid (London, UK: Phillip Allan 1930), 35

[iii] Ibid pg. 69

[iv] Ibid pg. 73-74

[v] Ibid pg. 84-92

[vi] Ibid pg. 109

[vii] Ibid pg. 151

[viii] F. Edmund Garrett, The Story of an African Crises (Westminster, UK: Archibald Constable and Co), 273- 286

[ix] Ibid pg. 89

Hugh Marshall Hole, The Jameson Raid (London, UK: Phillip Allan 1930), 192

[x] F. Edmund Garrett, The Story of an African Crises (Westminster, UK: Archibald Constable and Co), 89-90

[xi] Hugh Marshall Hole, The Jameson Raid (London, UK: Phillip Allan 1930), 170

[xii] Ibid pg. 186

[xiii] Ibid pg. 188

[xiv] Ibid pg. 213-216

[xv] F. Edmund Garrett, The Story of an African Crises (Westminster, UK: Archibald Constable and Co), 211-215